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This paper reviews the underlying rationale for intervention in the foreign exchange market 
and argues that intervention can at times be justified due to the market producing the “wrong 
rate”, to mitigate the effects of exchange rate overshooting and also to slow down the process 
of economic adjustment. However, in order to be effective foreign exchange market 
intervention needs to be of the non-sterilized variety, that is, affect the domestic money 
supply and short term interest rate. Unfortunately, as the case of the Peoples Bank of China 
and the recent case of the Swiss National Bank’s attempts to stem the appreciation of their 
currencies, the side effects have shown the rapid expansion of their money supplies and low 
interest rates have had imposed significant costs on their economies. The result is that the 
Cemtral Bank has to continually monitor the costs and benefits of their foreign exchange 
interventions and be prepared consider a return to floating when the costs become too high. 
 
 
Professor Keith Pilbeam 








Prior to the move to generalized floating in 1973, the adoption of floating exchange rates had 
long been advocated by eminent economists such as Milton Friedman (1953) and Harry 
Johnson (1970). However, the experience with floating rates over the last four decades has 
shown that they are not the panacea that many advocates had presupposed. This has led many 
economists to propose schemes designed to limit exchange rate flexibility such as John 
Williamson (1983) Target Zone proposal. In practice, there have been frequent occasions 
where Central Banks have intervened in the foreign exchange market in a bid to influence the 
exchange rate at which their currency is traded, hence the term ‘managed’ floating. 
 
In this paper we look at the economic rationale behind Central Bank intervention in 
the foreign exchange market. We then proceed to discuss the effectiveness of foreign 
exchange intervention making the point that the theoretical and empirical literature 
overwhelmingly suggests that to be effective in the medium term exchange market 
intervention needs to be non sterilized, that is, result in a change of the domestic money 
supply and short term interest rate. Sterilized intervention whereby the impact of the 
intervention on the money supply is offset by an open market intervention by the Central 
Bank can at best have only a very short term impact on the exchange rate. Finally, we 
consider two case studies of foreign exchange intervention and the associated costs and 
benefits in practice, namely, the cases of the Peoples Bank of China and the Swiss National 
Bank.  
Managed floating 
Since the advent of floating exchange rates in 1973 it has become evident that authorities 
have not always allowed their currency float freely but rather they have frequently intervened 
to influence the exchange rate. A number of rationales have been put forward to justify such 
intervention. Before examining some the most frequently used arguments for intervention it 
is necessary to assume that the authorities can influence the nominal and or real exchange 
rate in their desired direction, without such an assumption no rationale for intervention can 
exist. Further, only if it can be demonstrated that foreign exchange intervention has a superior 
benefit to cost impact than other policies, or that constraints prevent the use of superior 
policies, can exchange market intervention be justified. In the following discussion, it should 
be also remembered throughout that exchange rate management by the authorities can vary in 
degree from occasional intervention to influence the exchange rate to a permanent pegging. 
 
 The arguments for some degree of discretionary intervention to some extent overlap 
but fall into three main categories: (i) the authorities can choose an exchange rate more in line 
with economic fundamentals than the market; (ii) intervention is required to mitigate the 
costs of exchange rate ‘overshooting’; and (iii) intervention is an appropriate instrument for 
smoothing necessary economic adjustments. 
 
Authorities might be able to produce a more appropriate exchange rate 
For a variety of reasons the exchange rate produced by the market may be the “wrong rate” 
compared to underlying economic fundamentals. The market may use the wrong model, it 
may have the wrong perception about the future and will have difficulty in interpreting the 
implications of news relevant to the exchange rate. However, the fact that the market may 
produce the wrong rate does not justify intervention by the authorities; it is necessary to 
demonstrate that the authorities can choose a more appropriate rate. 
 
 There exists a case for intervention if the news or information available to the market 
is efficiently used but the news itself is either inadequate – increasing risk – or misleading, 
and the authorities are in possession of superior relevant information. Intervention in such 
circumstances can prove both stabilizing and profitable. However, it could be argued that a 
superior policy is for the authorities to abstain from intervention and release the relevant 
information to the market. Nevertheless, there may be circumstances under which such an 
information-release is not considered desirable, and even if the authorities were to release the 
relevant information to the market, there is no guarantee that the market would believe them. 
 
 Connected with the above argument is a far more convincing reason for the authorities 
to intervene. While it may be the case that the authorities do not know any more than the 
market regarding what is the correct rate, they should know better and sooner what they 
themselves are about to do (in most cases!). The point is that the authorities should be more 
capable than the market in predicting the future course of their policies and this is of 
relevance to the correct exchange rate. Given this, intervention in the foreign exchange 
market may be interpreted by the market as a commitment by the authorities to adopt a given 
course of action; if this is the case, economic agents may more readily lend their support to 
the a new policy helping to make it more effective and more speedily so than would 
otherwise be the case. Thus, there exists a case for official intervention on the grounds that 
the authorities have a better knowledge of their future policy intentions than private market 
participants. Official intervention in the foreign exchange market can literally ‘buy 
credibility’ convincing economic agents that the authorities intend to fulfill their stated 
domestic policy targets by committing the assets of the central bank in support of its declared 
future policy. A key postulate of the rational expectations literature is that the authorities will 
only be able to achieve their short-run inflation objectives painlessly if economic agents are 
convinced that the authorities intend to carry out their stated objectives. The opportunity to 
purchase some credibility by intervening in the foreign exchange market could prove to be a 
useful policy tool. 
 
Intervention to mitigate costs of exchange rate overshooting 
The Dornbusch (1976) overshooting model shows that a move to monetary restraint can lead 
to a short-run real exchange rate appreciation, while an expansionary monetary policy can 
lead to a real depreciation. These real exchange rate movements leading to over and 
undervaluations in relation to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) will exert effects on the real 
economy. In what follows, we shall refer to substantial and prolonged deviations from PPP as 
exchange rate misalignments. 
 
 Misaligned exchange rates distort the allocation of resources between tradables and 
non-tradables as well as consumption patterns between the two. Undervaluation by raising 
the domestic price level and placing downward pressure on real wages may spark off 
inflationary pressures, while overvaluation by squeezing the tradables sector may result in 
increased unemployment. Misalignment complicates and inhibits investment decisions 
because uncertainty as to the duration of the over/undervaluation will affect the profitability 
calculations concerning whether to invest in tradables or non-tradables, particularly inhibiting 
marginal investment decisions. 
 
 Misalignments almost certainly exert a ratchet effect on protectionism. In periods of 
undervaluation of the currency, resources that would ordinarily not be viable enter into the 
tradables sector but as the rate corrects itself they will come under increasing pressure and 
may then seek recourse to protection. Alternatively, if the currency is overvalued this will 
tend to lead to automatic protectionist cries due to the pressure on the tradables sector. It 
should also be remembered that undervaluation for one currency involves overvaluation for 
another and vice-versa, so that one could expect protectionism to be a global and persistent 
phenomenon so long as exchange rates are misaligned. Since an under/overvaluation must 
necessarily eventually be corrected, this will involve the various adjustment costs arising 
because of factor immobility occupationally and geographically; retraining of labour will 
involve costs and time  and aggregate demand cannot be painlessly varied at will. 
 
 Foreign exchange intervention designed to reduce the costs and extent of exchange 
rate overshooting can be justified. It is worth noting that the case for intervention in this 
instance is not in any way due to inefficiency in the foreign exchange market. The rate 
produced by the market is the correct rate but because of ‘sticky’ goods prices there are short-
run real exchange rate changes.  
 
Intervention to smooth the economic adjustment process 
There may exist a rationale for the authorities to intervene in the foreign exchange market to 
achieve a preferable exchange rate in the short run to permit a smoothing of the necessary 
adjustments that the economy must for various reasons undergo. The rationale for smoothing 
the adjustment process is that it is a painful process for those who have to adjust and is more 
acceptable at a controlled pace than a market-determined pace. 
 
 Suppose that a country has a persistent balance of payments surplus because the 
traded goods sector is too large relative to the non-traded sector. There will consequently be a 
tendency for an appreciation of the real exchange rate which will encourage factors to move 
from the traded goods sector to the non-traded sector. If the authorities are concerned about 
the possibility of large transitional unemployment resulting from such an appreciation, they 
may try to moderate the appreciation to allow time for the traded goods sector to contract and 
the non-tradables sector to expand, so as to avoid what they consider to be excessive 
transitional unemployment costs. Corden (1982) has coined the phrase ‘exchange rate 
protection’ to describe an exchange rate policy whereby a country protects its tradable goods 
sector relative to the non-tradables sector, for example by preventing or slowing down an 
exchange rate appreciation that would otherwise take place. Exchange market intervention 
can compare favourably to other methods of protection for the purpose of slowing down the 
necessary adjustment such as tariff protection. This is because exchange rate protection 
which involves influencing the real exchange rate and with it the accumulation of reserves 
must necessarily be a temporary method of protection, whereas tariffs and subsidies have a 
habit of becoming permanent features and, because of their explicit protective nature, tend to 
invite retaliation.  
 
 It is worth emphasizing that the adjustment arguments advanced for exchange rate 
intervention involve smoothing the adjustment process, not preventing it. Ideally, the 
exchange rate should be allowed to adjust towards its equilibrium rate at an optimum pace. It 
is the acceptance of the principle of exchange rate adjustment that ensures that the required 
changes in the economy do take place. 
 
The Effectiveness of Foreign Exchange Intervention 
There has been much debate in the literature, see Pilbeam (2001) concerning the effectiveness 
of foreign exchange intervention in both the long run and the short run. The overwhelming 
theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that that non sterilized intervention which 
influences the domestic money supply is far more effective at moving the exchange rate in 
the desired direction than sterilized intervention. The difference between sterilized and non 
sterilized intervention is set out below using hypothetical examples of the Swiss Franc and 
the Euro and the Polish Zloty and the Euro. In so doing we make a crucial distinction 
between non-sterilized intervention and sterilized intervention. 
 
 In Figure 1 the exchange rate is assumed to be fixed by the SNB at the point where 
the demand for Euros schedule (D1) intersects the supply of Euros schedule (S1) In Figure 
1(a) the exchange rate is assumed to be fixed by the SNB at SFR 1.20/€1. If there is an 
increase in the supply of Euros in the foreign exchange market to buy Swiss Francs the 
supply schedule shifts from S1 to S2 and there is a resulting pressure for the Swiss Franc to 
appreciate to SFR1/€1. To avert an appreciation of the Swiss Franc, it is necessary for the 
SNB to buy Q1–Q3 of Euros these SNB purchases shifting the demand for Euros from D1 to 
D2. Such an intervention enables the exchange rate to remain fixed at SFR 1.20/€1. 
Figure 1  Pegged Exchange rate regime with Swiss National Bank intervention to prevent  
an appreciation of the Swiss Franc 
 
The effect on the Swiss money market of the SNB buying Euros in the foreign exchange 
market is to increase the Swiss money supply from M1 to M2 and consequently lower the 
Swiss short-term interest rate from r1 to r2. Since buying Euros in the foreign exchange 
market has increased the Swiss money supply from M1 to M2, the intervention is of the non-
sterilized type. It is likely to be very effective in weakening the Swiss franc back to SFR 
1.20/€1 because it increases the amount of Swiss Francs in circulation and lowers the Swiss 
interest rate, both of which work to weaken the Swiss Franc to the desired level. 
The SNB could do as above, and allow the foreign exchange market intervention to 
increase the Swiss money supply and lower the Swiss interest rate, but this would risk the 
causing inflation in property, stocks and the prices of goods and services potentially causing 
overshooting its inflation target. In such circumstances, the SNB might try to sterilize the 
effects of the increased money supply by selling Treasury bills in an open-market operation, 
reducing the Swiss money supply in Figure 1(b) from M2 back to the original level M1. The 
problem with doing this, however, is that the Treasury bill sales will lower the price of 
Treasury bills and thereby raises the Swiss interest rate from r2 back to r1. The decrease in 
the amount of Swiss francs and the rises in the short term interest rate resulting from the 
sterilization policy would then tend to once again increase the attractiveness of Swiss franc in 
the foreign exchange market and induce further selling of the Euros (i.e. buying of Swiss 
Francs) which by shifting the supply from S2 further to the right would mean that the 
exchange rate will tend to go back towards SFR1/€1. As the Swiss money supply and interest 
rate returns to their levels M1 and r1 prior to the foreign exchange market intervention then it 
is highly likely the exchange rate would return to the SFR1/€1 rate prior to the intervention 
and consequently sterilized foreign exchange market intervention would be ineffective in 
achieving the weaker Swiss Franc desired by the SNB. 
 
  
Figure 2 Fixed exchange rate regime and National Bank of Poland intervenes to prevent 
a depreciation of the Polish Zloty 
 
Alternatively, consider the hypothetical case of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) pegging 
the Zloty to the Euro at PLN4.20/€1 but finds that there is pressure for the Zloty to depreciate 
due to increased demand for Euros which shifts the demand schedule from D1 to D2, there is 
a resulting pressure for the Euro to appreciate to say PLN5/€1. To avert a depreciation it is 
necessary for the NBP to sell Q1–Q3 of Euros in the foreign exchange market to purchase 
Zloty, these sales shifting the supply of Euros from S1 to S2. Such an intervention 
strengthens the PLN4.2/€1, decreasing the Polish Central Banks reserves of Euros and 
decreasing the amount of Zloty in circulation from M1 to M2 and raising the Polish interest 




The effect on the Polish money market of the NBP selling Euros in the foreign exchange 
market is to decrease the Polish money supply from M1 to M2 and consequently raise the 
Polish short-term rate of interest from r1 to r2 in Figure 2(b). Since the sale of Euros has 
decreased the Polish money supply the intervention is of the non-sterilized type. Such an 
intervention is likely to be very effective in strengthening the Zloty to PLN4.2/€1 because it 
decreases the amount of Zloty in circulation and raises the Polish interest rate both of which 
strengthen the Zloty in the foreign exchange market. Non-sterilized intervention of this type 
that directly affects the money supply and short-term interest rate is very effective in moving 
the exchange rate in the desired direction. 
 
The NBP could do as above and allow the foreign exchange market intervention to 
decrease the Polish money supply and raise the Polish interest, but this would risk a 
recession, a possible fall in stock and property prices and the risk of undershooting the NBP’s 
inflation target. In such circumstances, the NBP might try to sterilize the effects of the 
decreased money supply by buying Treasury bills in an open-market operation that would 
increase the money supply in Figure 2 (b) from M2 back to the original level M1. However, 
the Treasury bill purchases would increase the price of Treasury bills and lower the Polish 
interest rate from r2 back to r1. The increase in the Zloty money supply and the fall in interest 
rates resulting from the sterilization policy would then tend to shift the demand for Euros 
(D2) to the right such that the Zloty would head back towards 5PLN/1EUR. As such, it is 
highly unlikely that a sterilized foreign exchange market intervention would be effective in 
achieving the stronger Zloty desired by the NBP. 
 
 This begs the question as to why the central bank would wish to sterilize their foreign 
exchange market interventions, as this would undermine its ability to achieve the desired 
exchange rate? Part of the answer is that the central bank may hope to have a psychological 
impact on market participants whilst sticking to existing monetary and interest rate targets. 
Also knowledge that a Central Bank has been intervening in the foreign exchange market 
even if sterilized might in the very short term make traders reluctant to take on the Central 
Bank. Having said this, most traders will tend to quickly discount central bank intervention 
unless they see it is of the non-sterilized type, that is, leading to changes in the money supply 
and money-market interest rate.   
The policy lesson is clear, if a central bank want to influence the exchange rate then 
the most effective type of foreign exchange market intervention would be of the non-
sterilized type because such intervention leads to changes in the money supply and interest 
rates that reinforce the impact of the intervention. If the authorities decide to sterilize the 
impact of their interventions by offsetting open-market operations that move the money 
supply and interest rates back to the levels prior to the intervention, then they will most likely 
have no lasting exchange rate impact since none of the fundamentals change. 
3 Intervention in Practice the Cases of the Peoples Bank of China and the Swiss 
National Bank 
In this section, we briefly review the problems and issues faced by the Peoples Bank of China 
(PBOC) and Swiss National Bank (SNB) resulting from their attempts to prevent their 
currencies appreciating in the foreign exchange market. The two cases are interesting in that 
the People’s Bank of China has engaged in an unprecedented intervention over a long period 
of time. Whereas the Swiss National Bank ended its attempt to peg the Swiss Franc at a 
minimum of SFR1.20/€1 after just 3 years and 4 months and caused major market disruption 
when ending the peg on January 15th 2015 with the Swiss Franc jumping briefly from 
SFR1.20/€1 to SFR 0.8/€1 before setting later in the morning slightly above SFR1/€1. 
 
 The PBOC has been engaged in intervention on an unprecedented scale. As is shown 
the fact that its foreign exchange reserves have risen from $165 billion in 2000 to over $3,800 
billion in 2015. This suggests an average annual purchases of foreign currencies equivalent to 
over $240 billion and given that there are only around 250 trading days, suggests purchases 
of close to $1 billion equivalent per day. The main aim has been to prevent too rapid and 
appreciation of the Renminbi so as to keep up exports and so promote employment in the 
export industries. Also because the intervention has been of the non sterilized variety, it has 
meant that there has been a large growth in the Chinese money supply, artificially low 
interest rates and a rapid growth of related credit aggregates. This in turn has fuelled a 
massive increase in investment which since 2000 has averaged 43% of GDP the greatest ever 
recorded in history, which to some extent has been an objective of the policy makers keen to 
keep up the Chinese economic growth rate and levels of employment. 
 
 There have, however, been serious implications of this massive foreign exchange 
market intervention both for China and its trading partners. Most importantly, China has 
become an unbalanced economy over dependent on exports and investment with too little of 
its economic growth coming from domestic consumption (a mere 34.1% of GDP 2010-14 
according to the World Bank). There is also a suspicion that a lot of the domestic investment 
possibly as much as a staggering $6.8 trillion of investment since 2009 has been largely 
wasted according to a recent Chinese study by Xu Che and Wang Yuan published in the 
Shangha Securities News 20th November 2014. This means there could be a substantial 
amount of non performing loans hidden in the Chinese banking system. It has also meant that 
there is structural surplus in the Chinese current account which has led to frequent trade 
related clashes with its main trading partners particularly the United States. In addition, since 
much of the dollars that the Chinese have purchased in the foreign exchange market are then 
invested in US Treasury bonds it has enabled the US government to finance its record fiscal 
deficits at lower rates of interest and with greater ease than would ordinarily be expected. It is 
a strange world whereby communist China with a GDP per capita of around $6,800 in 2013 
lends money year after year to the capitalist United States that has a GDP per capita of 
$53,000 in 2013. We have now reached a point whereby the Chinese are so heavily invested 
in US Treasury securities that they are very concerned about programmes like quantitative 
easing and the risk of a spike in the US inflation rate and Treasury bond yields which could 
mean large capital losses on their holding of US Treasuries. 
 
 The second case to consider is that of the Swiss National Bank which became 
increasingly concerned about the rapid rise of the Swiss Franc from SFR1.67/€1 on 
November 2007 to SFR1.10/€1 by September 2011. Such a rapid appreciation was 
particularly damaging in the case of Switzerland where over 70% of GDP is exported. The 
Governor of the SNB on 6th September 2011 made an announcement that with immediate 
effect the SNB would not tolerate an exchange rate below SFR1.20/€1 and that the SNB was 
prepared to intervene to an unlimited extent to maintain that rate. The signal to the market 
was clear, the SNB would engage on unlimited printing of Swiss Francs to buy Euros in the 
foreign exchange market to maintain the new target rate, in other words, the intervention 
would be of the non sterilized type. The market reaction was to immediately move the rate 
above SFR1.20/€1 where it stayed without breaking the SFR1.20/€1 for three years and 4 
months.  
 
 The costs to the Swiss National Bank of trying to peg the exchange rate against the 
Euro have been mainly in the form of a rapid expansion of their monetary base and the 
lowering of short term interest rates such that they have even fallen below the zero bound. 
There has also been a massive increase in foreign exchange reserves from 255 billion CHF 
August 2011 to CHF 510 billion December 2014, the latter figure to equivalent over 78% of 
the Swiss GDP (CHF 650 billion). As such; the benefits of the peg such as an undervaluation 
of the Swiss Franc boosting exports, artificially low interest rates boosting property and 
stockmarket valuations have increasingly been offset by the rising costs of the policy. 
 
 The costs of the policy include the risk of large capital losses for the SNB from its 
holding of Euro denominated debt. The risk of capital losses from its accumulation of Euros 
because of its ownership structure may have been a particular concern. The SNB is 45 per 
cent owned by private shareholders and the rest by the cantons. Many of the private 
individuals receive dividends from the SNB and the cantons were already complaining about 
insufficient cash transfers from the SNB. This ownership structure is very different from most 
other central banks which are basically government departments owned by the Treasury and 
ultimately the taxpayer.  
 
 Other costs of the SNB policy included the risk of future inflation from the rapid 
expansion of the monetary base and the risk that a greater appreciation would eventually be 
required in the long run the more the longer policy persisted. The timing of the ending of the 
peg decision was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the ECB was likely to announce a 
large scale Quantitative Easing programme which by further weakening the Euro would have 
required even more extensive money creation by the SNB and even larger rises in its foreign 
exchange reserves of Euros. 
   
Conclusions 
There are many reasons that may justify intervention in the foreign exchange market such as 
the market producing the wrong rate, a desire to reduce the impact of real exchange rate 
overshooting on the economy and as a means to slow down the process of economic 
adjustment. However, as discussed in this paper it is essential to carefully weigh up the costs 
and benefits of a foreign exchange policy over the short, medium and long term. 
 
  The overwhelming theoretical and empirical suggests that foreign exchange policy 
can only exert significant effects on the exchange rate if it is of the non sterilized variety. 
That means changes in the domestic money supply and short term interest rates are required 
to exert significant exchange rate effects. In the cases of both China and Switzerland the costs 
of their monetary expansions and low interest rates resulting from their foreign exchange 
interventions have risen over time/ One sign of this was when the Chinese ended their for peg 
to the dollar in July 2005 and replacing it with a policy of heavily managed floating designed 
to prevent too rapid an appreciation of the Renminbi. In the case of Switzerland, a policy 
designed to prevent the appreciation of the Swiss Franc below a minimum of SFR1.20/€1 
became increasingly untenable eventually resulting in a far more sudden unexpected 
appreciation to take place. The loss of credibility to the SNB, that right up until the 
announcement said that it would maintain the 1.20SFR/€1 peg may yet prove to be major 
watershed as it has signaled to financial market participants that Central Bankers cannot be 
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